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This paper formulates a structural empirical model of heterogeneous firms whose workers
exhibit fair-wage preferences. In the underlying theoretical framework, such preferences
lead to a link between a firm’s operating profits on the one hand and wages of workers
employed by this firm on the other hand. The latter establishes an exporter wage premium,
since exporters have higher profits, given their productivity, than non-exporting firms. We
estimate the parameters of the model in a data-set of five European economies and find that,
when evaluated at these parameter values, the model has a high level of explanatory power.
The estimates also enable us to quantify the exporter wage premium and the consequences of
trade for the main variables of interest. According to our results, openness to international
trade contributes to greater inequality across firms in terms of both operating profits and
average wages. We also find evidence for gains from trade for all five countries, which go
along with negative, but quantitatively moderate, aggregate employment effects.
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An important strand of research in international economics is concerned with distributional ef-
fects of openness in the presence of labour market imperfections. Theoretical contributions on
the matter go back to the seminal work of Brecher (1974) who analysed the consequences of mini-
mum wages in interaction with openness to trade for relative factor prices and the unemployment
of workers. Brecher’s pioneering work was followed by papers that added micro-foundations of
the labour market imperfections.1 The most recent theoretical contributions, which combine
labour market imperfections with new trade models that allow for firm heterogeneity within
sectors, have highlighted a new dimension of income inequality resulting from firm-specific wage
rates. In Egger and Kreickemeier (2009, 2011) and Amiti and Davis (2011) there is rent-sharing
at the firm level resulting from workers’ fair wage concerns, Davis and Harrigan (2011) generate
wage differences across heterogeneous firms by assuming firm-specific monitoring technology in
an efficiency wage framework à la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), and in Helpman, Itskhoki, and
Redding (2010) more productive firms pay higher wages since they have an incentive to screen
their workforce more thoroughly, which leaves them with workers of higher average ability.
Relying on insights from this most recent theoretical literature, it is the aim of this paper to
shed new light on the interplay between trade openness and inequality from an empirical point
of view. To guide the empirical analysis, we set up a theoretical trade model, in which the inter-
action of heterogeneity of producers in their productivity and labour market imperfection leads
to self-selection of firms into export status and firm-specific wage payments. The combination
of these two features is instrumental for an exporter wage premium and gives rise to aggregate
inequality and unemployment. Labour market imperfection is captured by means of a fair-wage
mechanism, assuming that workers provide effort in accordance with a fair-wage constraint, as
in Egger and Kreickemeier (2009, 2011) and Amiti and Davis (2011). A key advantage of this
model is that one estimable parameter, referred to as the fair-wage parameter is a compact
measure of labour market imperfection. Furthermore, firm-specific wage rates in the fair wage
model are explained by rent sharing at the firm level (rather than by compositional effects of
the firm-specific workforce), which in their detailed empirical analysis on Mexican firms, Fŕıas,
1Different approaches to model labour market imperfections include trade unions (Brander and Spencer, 1988;
Brecher and Van Long, 1989), search and matching frictions (Davidson, Martin, and Matusz, 1988, 1999; Hosios,
1990), efficiency wages (Matusz, 1994, 1996), and fair wage concerns of workers (Agell and Lundborg, 1995;
Kreickemeier and Nelson, 2006).
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Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2009) have shown to be an important contributor to wage differences
across firms.2
We structurally estimate the key parameters of this model for a cross-sectional data-set of
113,326 firms from five European countries.3 Using these estimates, the exporter wage premium
is found to average nearly 10 percent in our data-set. Comparing the wage distribution across
firms predicted by our model with the actual distribution in our data set, we find that the model
has a high predictive power and can explain more than 70 percent of the variation in wages across
firms. Our estimates and the data at hand support counterfactual experiments. In particular, we
analyse for the five countries in our data-set the role of openness to trade for the distribution of
wages and operating profits across firms, where changes in these two measures are linked by the
fair-wage based rent-sharing mechanism. The model generates heterogeneous responses across
firms to a country’s movement from autarky to trade, which can be summarised by adjustments
in the standard deviations of operating profits and wages. We show that the observed extent
of trade has significantly increased inequality for both variables across firms relative to autarky,
with the standard deviation increasing between 15 and 25 percent on average, depending on the
method of measurement.
Aside from looking at the distributional consequences of trade, we also use our model to look
at the link between aggregate gains from trade and aggregate employment. We show that the
welfare gains needed to achieve positive employment effects for the five countries in our data-set
would be high: depending on the country, the number lies between 70 and 334 percent. We then
use a simplified version of our model to derive suggestive evidence that the true gains from trade
are smaller than these values, and that hence we would expect trade to have had a negative
effect on aggregate employment.
While our paper is among the first ones to study empirically the interplay between openness
and firm-specific wages using a structural model, it is related to a large literature that uses
reduced-form analysis for exploring the wage and employment effects of globalisation – of course
without providing insights on the consequences of trade for the whole distribution of wages
paid by firms of different productivity.4 Such work has been conducted at various levels of
2See also Klein, Moser, and Urban (2010) and Eaton, Kortum, Kramarz, and Sampognaro (2011) for evidence
on a within skill-group exporter wage premium in Germany and France, respectively.
3Those countries are ones for which we have firm-level data on both domestic sales and exports: Bosnia and
Herzegovina; Croatia; France; Serbia; and Slovenia.
4To the best of our knowledge, there is only one other study that looks at the link between openness and firm-
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aggregation, the country (Egger, Greenaway, and Seidel, 2011), the industry (Klein, Schuh, and
Triest, 2003; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005), the firm (Trefler, 2004; Amiti and Davis, 2011),
and the worker (Egger, Pfaffermayr, and Weber, 2007; Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2007;
Munch and Skaksen, 2008; Klein, Moser, and Urban, 2010; Eaton, Kortum, Kramarz, and
Sampognaro, 2011). The evidence suggests that (final and intermediate goods) imports tend to
replace domestic jobs while exports create jobs so that reciprocal trade liberalisation tends to
have only little effects on wages and employment (Klein, Schuh, and Triest, 2003). While some
work considers differences in the effects across industries and types of workers, it appears to be
the case that consequences of exports versus imports are found to materialize both within types
of workers and within industries (Klein, Moser, and Urban, 2010; Eaton, Kortum, Kramarz, and
Sampognaro, 2011).
By estimating aggregate employment effects of trade, our model is also related to a recent
study by Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011), who find for a sample of 20 OECD countries
that higher trade openness systematically lowers unemployment. Similar to the other studies
mentioned above and in contrast to our approach, Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011)
provide a reduced-form analysis. In a similar vein, Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) estimate
the impact of trade on unemployment using information from an even larger country set –
including 92 developed and developing economies. Their study documents a significant difference
between short-run and long-run employment effects, with trade exerting a negative impact on
unemployment in the long run. Taking stock, it seems fair to say that existing studies do not find
strong support for our observation of a negative employment effect of trade. However, previous
findings are also not at odds with ours, as a direct comparison of the respective employment
effects is not possible. On the one hand, in our counterfactual analysis we focus on the selection
effects of trade and ignore other possibly important channels through which employment effects
of trade can materialize (see above). On the other hand, we rely on a structural empirical
approach and thus can allow in principle for a non-monotonic relationship between the key
variables of interest when conducting the counterfactual analysis. As pointed out in Egger and
Kreickemeier (2009, 2011) the non-monotonicity of labour market effects may indeed be an issue
specific wages in a structural empirical model, namely Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler, and Redding (2011). Their
empirical study employs detailed Brazilian data for manufacturing industries form a large matched employer-
employee data-set. This data-set has the advantage that it allows controlling for worker characteristics, which is
not possible in our data-set. However, it restricts the analysis to a single country and hence does not allow for
inference upon whether and to what extent the effects of trade on firm-specific wages vary across countries.
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in a Melitz (2003)-type model with labour market imperfections, so that inferring the impact of
large changes in key model parameters – as, for instance, a movement from autarky to trade or
a significant change in trade openness – from point estimates of a reduced-form analysis may be
problematic.
There are several advantages of a structural approach over reduced from studies, with a par-
ticular one being that a structural approach allows to account for potentially complex nonlinear
(e.g., demand or pricing) relationships underlying the data-generating process.5 Furthermore,
a structural model allows for a systematic estimation of a specifitc model’s parameters and an
assessment of the explanatory power of that model, its mechanisms and transmission channels
(e.g., the selection effects which are at the heart of new new trade theory). This makes it not
only better suited for the counterfactual analysis considered here but renders our estimation
results also amenable to ex-ante analysis since one could take the estimated parameters to other
data-sets in order to conduct a wide range of possible counterfactual experiments as is custom
in other fields of international economics (e.g., in trade policy analysis based on computable
general equilibrium models). Also, exploiting the structure of a theoretical model linking labour
market imperfections and firm activity in the (partially) open economy helps avoiding problems
of endogeneity of regressors in empirical work in so far as such endogeneity may root in the mis-
representation of the functional form of the very models that are utilized to formulate testable
hypotheses.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we outline the theoretical
model underlying the structural empirical work at the heart of the paper and illustrate the
key mechanisms at work. Section 3 describes the data-set utilized in estimation, it presents
estimates of key model variables, quantifies the exporter wage premium, and assesses the model
fit. Section 4 provides insights about the consequences of trade liberalisation on the distribution
of wages and operating profits across firms, and it furthermore provides tentative evidence on
the employment effects of trade. The last section concludes with a summary of the key findings
and an outline of future work.
5We tend to assume complex nonlinear relationships with great empirical success in many different applications
in international economics. See, for instance, Eaton and Kortum (2002) or Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) for
the estimation of structural empirical models of trade based on isoelastic demand functions of consumers.
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2 Theoretical background
In this section, we describe key elements of a trade model with heterogeneous firms and labour
market imperfections, which in many respects is similar to Egger and Kreickemeier (2009)
(EK2009, henceforth). They introduce labour market frictions by means of a fair-wage ef-
fort mechanism into a Melitz (2003)-type trade model, and we extend this framework in two
important dimensions: first, we modify the fair-wage constraint in order to allow for an exporter
wage premium; second, we account for asymmetric countries and thus make the model more
suitable for the empirical application in Section 3.
2.1 Profit-maximisation in the final and intermediate goods sector
Let us consider two economies (i = 1, 2) that are open to trade and produce two types of
goods: differentiated intermediates, q, and a homogeneous final output, Y . Either economy
has a representative consumer who uses all of his/her income for the consumption of Y , which
is supplied by atomistic firms in a perfectly competitive market and can be costlessly traded
internationally. Its price is therefore equalised between countries. We choose Y as the numéraire,














where qi(v) denotes demand for intermediate good variety v in country i, Vi is the set of inter-
mediate goods that are available for final goods production in i, M ti is the Lebesgue measure
of set Vi, representing the mass of intermediate goods that are used in the production of Yi,
and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the different varieties of q in the production
process. With the price of Y normalised to one, Eq. (1) represents also aggregate revenues, and




pi(v)qi(v)dv. This leads to an isoelastic demand function for each variety of






where pi(v) denotes the price of variety v in country i.
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In the intermediate goods market, there is a continuum of firms, each producing one unique
variety. The mass of domestic producers in country i is given byMdi and together with exporters
Mxj from country j (j 6= i) these firms add up to the mass of producers that serve the domestic




j . The intermediate goods market in either country is characterised by
monopolistic competition, implying that firms take aggregate variables as given, while they set
prices as a monopolist in the market for their own variety. Denoting unit costs of selling variety






Unit costs of selling in market i are equal to unit production costs c̃i(v) for domestic varieties.
Imported varieties are subject to standard iceberg trade costs, represented by parameter τ > 1,
and therefore ci(v) ≡ τj c̃j(v) for imported varieties. Unit production costs c̃i(v) are constant,
and depend on technology and wages, both of which are firm-specific. Technology for each firm
is exogenous, as in Melitz (2003), while wage determination at the firm level is explained in the
next subsection.
2.2 Firm-specific wages in an imperfectly competitive labour market
The labour market model starts from the premise that workers have fairness preferences relating
their effort to the wage they are paid relative to some reference wage, which they consider to
be fair (see Akerlof, 1982 and Akerlof and Yellen, 1988, 1990). To put it formally, we assume
ε = min[w/ŵ, 1], where ε is effort, w is the wage per worker and ŵ is the fair-wage reference.
Under this specification, a firm cannot reduce its effective labour costs by setting a wage that
is lower than ŵ and, hence, has no incentive to do so. Therefore, we can safely assume that
firms pay at least the fair wage and workers provide full effort ε = 1.6 Furthermore, provided
that each firm finds a sufficient number of workers when offering w = ŵ, this is what they do
in equilibrium. Throughout our analysis, we focus on a parameter domain that gives rise to
involuntary unemployment, so that demand is indeed the short side of the labour market and
6Actually, effective labour costs are the same for any w ≤ ŵ and, similar to Akerlof and Yellen (1990), we
therefore impose the additional assumption that firms have a slight preference for paying fair wages and, hence,
“when profits are unaffected by payment of fair wages, they prefer to do so” (p. 272).
7
firms do not have to pay a wage that is higher than ŵ.
From the discussion above, it is immediate that in the fair wage-effort model the labour costs
of firms depend crucially on the worker’s reference wage, ŵ. Akerlof (1982) and the literature
following him point out that the wage considered to be fair by a worker has a firm-internal
and a firm-external component. The firm-external component is commonly associated with the
worker’s income opportunities outside his/her present job, which are the same for all ex ante
identical agents and equal the average income of employed and unemployed workers. We set
unemployment benefits to zero, which leads to an expression of (1− ui)w̄i for the firm-external
component of the fair wage in country i, where ui is the unemployment rate and w̄i the average
wage of employed workers.7 As outlined by Danthine and Kurmann (2007, p. 858), the firm-
internal component should account for the observation that “the better (worse) the firm is doing,
the more (less) the worker expects to be paid in exchange for a given level of effort”. Egger and
Kreickemeier (2011) point to total operating profits as a suitable measure of firm performance
in this respect.8 These operating profits depend on a firm’s location as well as on its exporter
status and are denoted by ψti(v) – where superscript t is used for referring to total operating
profits from domestic and foreign activity. Hence, the firm-internal component gives rise to a
rent-sharing mechanism that induces firm-specific wage payments in our setting.9 Imposing the
additional assumption that the fair wage can be expressed as a weighted geometric mean of its






with θi ∈ (0, 1) denoting a rent-sharing (or fair-wage) parameter that can be country-specific.
Of course, with ex ante identical workers, firm-specific wage payments are consistent with an
equilibrium only if workers in firms with low profitability cannot successfully underbid wage
7It is straightforward within this framework to allow for strictly positive unemployment benefits, financed by
lump-sum taxes. This extension would leave the basic mechanisms unaffected, and we therefore use the more
parsimonious specification in the following.
8Amiti and Davis (2011) suggest using pure profits instead of operating ones. While this modification would
not affect the main insights from our analysis qualitatively, it is less attractive from the purpose of analytical
tractability and, hence, we rely on operating profits as the firm-internal component of fair wages in the subsequent
analysis.
9Rent sharing does also materialize in the EK2009 framework, where labour productivity serves as the firm-
internal component of the fair wage. However, since labour productivity is constant and does not depend on
a firm’s exporter status, the EK2009 model excludes important aspects of wage payments in an international
context. In particular, it does not allow for an exporter wage premium, which has been shown to be important
empirically (see Fŕıas, Kaplan, and Verhoogen, 2009).
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payments in firms with high profitability. In the fair wage theory, it is a combination of infor-
mation asymmetry and incomplete contracting which prevents such underbidding (see EK2009
for a more detailed discussion).
2.3 The open economy equilibrium
Firm entry into domestic production and into exporting is modeled as is standard in Melitz-type
frameworks: there is an unbounded pool of entrants deciding on paying a fixed market entry cost,
which is immediately sunk, that allows them to draw labour productivity ϕ from the common
distribution Gi(ϕ). Knowing their productivity, they then decide whether to start producing,
and which markets (only domestic, or domestic and foreign) to serve. Fixed export costs ensure
that only a subset of the producing firms find it profitable to export. Two differences between
our setup and the standard Melitz model stand out. First, following EK2009 all three types of
fixed costs in the model (entry costs f ei , fixed production costs f
d
i , and fixed export costs f
x
i ) are
measured in units of final output, rather than labour. This is to allow for identical fixed costs
across firms in our setup that in equilibrium features firm-specific wage rates, thereby focusing
on marginal cost heterogeneity, as in Melitz (2003). Second, due to the fair wage constraint the
entry decision into the foreign market has feedback effects on a firm’s competitive position in
the home market, since higher total profits due to exporting lead to higher firm-specific wages
via the rent sharing mechanism, and therefore to higher marginal cost at home.
In order to describe the sorting of firms into the respective categories, we need to derive the
following partial results:
(i) the relative wage and operating profit of two firms of differing productivities but with the
same export status;
(ii) the relative wage and domestic operating profit of an exporting and a non-exporting firm
of the same productivity;
(iii) the relative productivity of the least productive firm and the least productive exporting
firm.
To derive result (i), note that due to constant mark-up pricing operating profits at the firm
level ψi are a constant fraction 1/σ of firm revenues ri. Combining the demand function, Eq.
9




















where ξi ≡ (σ − 1)/[1 + θi(σ − 1)], and firms 1 and 2 are constrained to be either two exporting
firms or two non-exporting firms. Hence, for two firms in country i with the same export status,
relative wages and operating profits are determined solely by relative productivities.
For result (ii), we make use of the standard feature of monopolistic competition models
with CES demand that export revenues of an exporting firm are a fraction τ1−σ of its domestic
revenues, when controlling for economy-wide variables in the two markets. Using this result, as
well as Eqs. (2) and (4), the relative wage and domestic operating profit of the same firm in the






















The term Ri is to be interpreted as the export market potential for country i: Ri is larger the
smaller the iceberg transport cost, and the larger the average revenue per firm selling in the
export market relative to the domestic market. Eq. (6) shows that entering the export market
raises wage costs and thus lowers a firm’s revenues and profits in the domestic market via the
feedback effect described above.
For the derivation of result (iii) we use the condition that the marginal exporting firm with
productivity ϕxi must make the same total profits when exporting and not exporting, respectively,




































where ϕdi is the domestic cutoff productivity, and the last equality sign is due to the condition
that the marginal firm in the market makes zero profits, implying that its operating profits
rni (ϕ
d
i )/σ are equal to domestic fixed costs f
d
i . Using Eq. (6) we can substitute for the relative

















i > 1 (and therefore self-selection of the most productive firms into exporting) is
ensured by assuming that fixed export costs fxi are sufficiently large.
For the empirical implementation of our model in the next section we make the common
assumption that the cumulative distribution function of productivities is Pareto: Gi(ϕ) = 1 −
(ϕ/ϕ̄i)
−ki , with ki being the shape parameter and ϕ̄i being the lower floor of the support region
of the respective distribution in country i. In this case, the share of exporting firms in country






















By simply putting together the results derived so far, we can now summarise our theoretical
model in two equations, both of which have a straightforward graphical representation. First,
we can express the operating profits of an i-borne firm of any given productivity relative to the
operating profits of the least productive firm in this country (these are labelled “normalised”







































i ) to denote the profile of normalised
operating profits as a function of normalised firm productivity. This profile is increasing in




i . At this cutoff, the profile of normalised total operating profits shifts upwards
and becomes steeper as exporters earn operating profits from domestic and foreign activity.
In contrast, the profile for normalised domestic operating profits (Ψdi ) shifts downwards and
becomes flatter, since access to the foreign market is associated with higher wage payments and
thus lower domestic profits, according to Eq. (6). The size of the shift as well as the change in





















Figure 1: Profile of operating profits
Second, we can express the wage paid by a firm of any given productivity based in country
i relative to the wage paid by the least productive firm based in this country. In direct analogy































10Our model does not give a clear prediction regarding the curvature of the two Ψi segments in Figure 1. The
respective profiles are concave (convex) if 1 > (< ξi), i.e. if 1 > (<)(σ− 1)(1− θi). For a graphical representation
we consider a linear shape, while in the empirical analysis we will estimate the values of σ and θi and, thus,
provide insights upon the true size of ξi in our data-set.
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Figure 2 illustrates the wage profile, usingWi ≡ wi(ϕ)/wi(ϕ
d
i ) to denote the profile of normalised
wages as a function of normalised firm productivity. As shown in this figure, wages are increasing
and concave in productivity ϕ. The profile shifts upwards at the normalised exporter cutoff
ϕxi /ϕ
d
i and the gradient of the profile is steeper for exporters than non-exporters. The reason
for the latter is that exporters are active at home and abroad and thus realize additional profits
from serving foreign consumers. Workers participate in these profit gains due to the rent-
sharing mechanism that is introduced by the fair wage-effort model in Subsection 2.2. Comparing
profilesWi and Ψi, one can see that normalised wages are less sensitive to a change in normalised
productivity than normalised operating profits. This is because the fair wage reference of workers
in Eq. (4) contains a firm-external component that generates wage compression between firms,
ceteris paribus.11 In the context of the model, the exporter wage premium in percent is constant



















Figure 2: Wage profile
11In contrast to Ψi, we can be sure that both segments of Wi are strictly concave since θiξi < 1.
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3 Empirical analysis
Our goal in this section is an empirical implementation of the theoretical model developed in
Section 2 which allows us to estimate its key parameters. These parameter estimates are then
used to formulate a numerical model on the basis of which we can quantify the country-specific
exporter wage premium. We furthermore assess the goodness of fit of the model by comparing
estimated and observed wage profiles across firms in the data.
3.1 Data
A data base that provides information across firms, countries, and time about many of the
key variables of interest is Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus Database. Apart from balance sheet
data, this source contains data on exports (levels and status) across time and firms in five
European countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatia; France; Serbia; and Slovenia.12 Data for
all countries covered are available for the period 2000 to 2008. An advantage of this data-base
is that all information on profits, revenues, exports, employees, or wages per employee can be
gathered from the same source for several countries. A disadvantage is that data on skills of
workers are not available (see Budd, Konings, and Slaughter, 2005).
Table 1 summarizes the number of firms active in the average year and the percentage of
exporters among those. Since inspection of the firm-level panel data reveals that imputation was
used by the data provider, we refrain from exploiting the time-series variation and resort to an
analysis of the cross-section variation in the data. Furthermore, we do not associate firms with
industries (sectors), nor do we make use of the industry-dimension in our data-set (see Eaton,
Kortum, and Sotelo, 2011, for a similar strategy). The reason is that a significant share of firms
is active in more than one NACE (revision 1) industry, even when using as highly aggregated
data as 2-digit industries. Lacking detailed information on the composition of a firm’s output,
we would have to classify firms as belonging to the main sector they operate in (according to
their sales and own reporting). Hence, industry-level effects are prone to aggregation bias, and
may be misleading.
−− Table 1 about here −−
12Amadeus contains many more countries. However, the quality of export data restricts our sample to the five
mentioned economies.
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Table 1 illustrates that there is one big country in the sample with almost 100, 000 firms in
the average year: France. The other countries are smaller: about 6, 000 firms are covered for
Serbia in the average year, and the smallest country in the sample is Bosnia and Herzegovina
with less than 1, 500 firms in the average year. There is not only large variation in country
size, but also considerable variation in export market participation. According to Table 1, only
about 38 percent of the active firms export in Serbia (possibly a consequence of the political and
economic isolation of Serbia at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century), while
about 45 percent of the French firms and around 60 percent of firms in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, and Slovenia export in the average year between 2000 and 2008.
−− Table 2 about here −−
Table 2 summarizes average values and standard deviations for log of revenues (sales; rtvi),
log of operating profits (ψtvi), log of exports, log of number of employees, and log of wages per
employee (wvi) across all firms per country. Thereby, we use the convention of referring to firms
by subscript v and to countries by subscript i. All figures, except for the number of employees,
are based on values in thousands of nominal Euros. For instance, the figures in the table suggest
that average sales for firms are largest in Slovenia and smallest in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One
obtains a similar regional pattern for firm-level variables when using operating profits, exports,
number of employees, or average wages. In the following subsection we will outline estimation
procedures for and estimates of the fundamental parameters and variables of interest. In general,
we will report point estimates and standard errors which are based on bloc-bootstrapping with
1,000 replications.
3.2 Estimation in steps
Estimating the elasticity of substitution between product varieties σ:




= σ + errorvi, (12)
where rtvi and ψ
t
vi denote total revenues (sales) and operating profits of a firm v in country i, σ
is the elasticity of substitution between varieties v and errorvi is a disturbance term.
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For the sake of efficiency in parameter estimation, one may allow for clustering of errorvi at
the level of i, but this does not affect the point estimate of σ. Estimation of Eq. (12) with the
sample as in Tables 1 and 2 leads to a point estimate of σ̂ ≃ 6.698 and a standard error of 0.030.
It might be that the assumption of pooling σ across industries appears rather strong. Allowing
σ to vary across (NACE revision 1) 2-digit industries indexed as h = 1, ...,H, leads to an
average estimate of H−1
∑H
h=1 σ̂h ≃ 7.297 with a standard deviation across industries of 10.886.
Hence, there is sizable variation in σ across industries, but the industry-level estimates are well
centered in the neighbourhood of the average value of 6.698 so that we may draw inference
about aggregate relationships from pooled estimates. Furthermore, taking into account the
aforementioned problems associated with the assignment of firms to specific sectors, disregarding
industry-level estimates seems advisable in a context as ours which is focused on aggregate
measures. The σ-estimate from the pooled regression is of similar magnitude as those reported
in other empirical studies (see Broda and Weinstein, 2006) and well in line with parameter
values typically employed for the calibration of trade models (see Arkolakis, 2010; Arkolakis and
Muendler, 2010).
Estimating the country-specific rent-sharing parameter θi:
A parameter which is at the heart of our analysis is θi, the rent-sharing parameter which is a
compact measure of labour market imperfections in our setting. To estimate it, we can make
use of the fair-wage constraint in Eq. (4). Taking logs on both sides of this equation, we can
postulate a regression of the following form
lnwvi = θi ln r
t
vi + µi + errorvi, (13)
where µi is a fixed country-year effect, controlling for the firm-external component of the workers’
reference wage, (1− ui) w̄i, which is weighted by the country-specific factor (1−θi) in our model.
−− Table 3 about here −−
Estimation results for the model in Eq. (13) are summarised in Table 3. As the table
indicates, the weighted average of θ across all firms and countries amounts to 0.102 with a
robust standard error of 0.001. The country-specific estimates θ̂i vary between 0.053 for Bosnia
and Herzegovina and 0.150 for Serbia. All of the estimates θ̂i are significantly different from
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zero at one percent. Moreover, F-tests (not reported in the table) reject the null hypothesis that
parameters θi and µi are poolable across countries at one percent.
Calculating parameter ξi:
With the parameter estimates σ̂ and θ̂i at hand, we can simply compute
ξ̂i =
σ̂ − 1
1 + θ̂i(σ̂ − 1)
. (14)
The respective results are summarised in the last pair of columns of Table 3. That table reports
estimates for individual countries as well as the weighted average ξ̂. The table suggests that the
estimates ξ̂i vary to some extent around the average ξ̂ = 3.685, but that the variation is not too
big (all estimates ξ̂i lie between 3.1 and 4.5).
13 However, we should recognize that ξ̂i will enter in
the exponent of variables so that some small variation in it can account for nontrivial differences
in the magnitude of comparative static effects. For that reason, we rely on country-specific
estimates ξ̂i in the subsequent analysis.
Estimating the country-specific Pareto shape parameter ki:
A third fundamental parameter in our analysis is the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution,
ki. Like the fair wage parameter θi, we allow ki to vary across countries. In estimating ki, we
follow the strategy of Arkolakis (2010) and Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) and make use of the
fact that, when randomly drawing an exporter from the total population of a country’s exporters,
the probability that this firm has higher revenues than an exporter with a productivity level
ϕp is equal to 1 − Prpi = (ϕp/ϕ
x
i )
−ki , where Prpi is the relative percentile of exporter v in
the respective revenue distribution (of domestic exporters). Equipped with this insight, we can
calculate average revenues of exporters with a productivity equal to or higher than ϕp. Denoting
13Table 3 also reports the weighted average standard error for the weighted average ξ̂. However, this variable
must be interpreted with care as it is not informative about the dispersion of ξ-values around ξ̂ in the pooled
sample, but rather captures the accuracy of the country-level estimates. For that reason, we do not further discuss
average standard errors of computed variables in the main text.
17
the respective average as r̄xpi and substituting ϕp/ϕ
x











Substituting γi ≡ ξi/ki, rankpi ≡ 100× (1− Prpi), and taking logs on both sides of Eq. (15), we
can formulate the following estimation equation
ln rxpi = −γi ln rankpi + µi + errorpi, (16)
where µi is a fixed country effect, and rankpi ∈ {1, ..., 99}. Eq. (16) gives an estimate γ̂i for each
country, and in combination with the estimates for ξi in Table 3 we can compute k̂i = ξ̂i/γ̂i.
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−− Table 4 about here −−
The second column in Table 4 summarizes the findings for the estimates γ̂i. For the pooled
sample, we obtain an estimate of γ̂ = 0.861, with a robust standard error of 0.004. Poolability
of γi across countries is rejected at one percent. Hence, assuming one parameter, γi = γ for all
i, is not justifiable with the data at hand. The estimates for γ̂i are fairly close to those reported
in Arkolakis (2010) and Arkolakis and Muendler (2010): 0.67 and 0.83, respectively. Note that
in our model existence of a finite positive mean of the Pareto distribution of productivity levels
requires γi < 1, which is supported by the estimates in our data-set. Column 3 displays computed
k̂i for the five individual countries as well as the weighted average for the whole sample, which
amounts to k̂ = 4.306. The estimates for the individual countries take values in between 3.994
for Serbia and 5.965 for Bosnia and Herzegovina and are significantly higher than those found
by Del Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano (2006), who rely on a different estimation approach and









it is straightforward to calculate Eq. (15).
15Two remarks are in order here: First, in principle, we can relate any exporter’s revenues to its relative
position in the productivity distribution: rxi (ϕp) = (1− Prpi)
−ξi/ki rxi (ϕ
x
i ). However, working with averages has
the advantage that our results make use of all information and do not rely on just a few observations, namely those
for the p ∈ {1, ..., 99} firms. Second, in principle we could also use information on non-exporters for estimating
ki. However, since from our model we should not expect non-exporters in the upper tail of the productivity
distribution, we cannot directly apply the technique used here for inferring insights on ki from non-exporters.
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Estimating country-specific productivity cutoff ratio ϕxi /ϕ
d
i :
With Pareto distributed productivities, the estimated productivity cutoff ratio for exporting and
non-exporting firms is simply given by χ
−1/k̂i
i , where exporter share χi is directly observable
in the data-set. The respective values of χ
−1/k̂i
i are summarised in the penultimate column of
Table 4. The productivity cutoff ratio is fairly small and amounts to only 1.204 on average.
The country-level values vary between 1.093 for Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1.272 for Serbia.
This suggests that Serbian exporters must be more productive relative to national firms to be
able to survive at the export market than, say, firms in France and even more so than firms in
other comparably small countries in the sample. However, the differences in the estimates for
the productivity cutoff ratios are not very large for our country sample.
Estimating country-specific export market potential Ri:
We now estimate for each country the export market potential Ri as defined in Eq. (7). As a








where rtxi denotes total revenues of the marginal exporter and r
nx
i denotes the hypothetical
(counterfactual) revenues that this firm could realize if it did not export. While our data-set
provides information about rtxi for each country, no direct information is available, of course,






i , where r
nd
i
denotes domestic revenues of the marginal producer in country i. Information on the latter













The second column of Table 5 depicts the computed export market potential R̂i for each country
i.
−− Table 5 about here −−
As shown in Table 5 the export market potential amounts to 3.533 on average with a standard
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error of 0.099. This points to a fairly high degree of openness of the average country in our
sample. Country-level values lie between 1.152 for Serbia and 4.187 for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The variation in the estimates R̂i is quite sizable, and since higher values of R̂i indicate that
a country is ceteris paribus better integrated in (or more open to) the world economy, the
respective figures in Table 5 seem to be well in line with insights from other studies that smaller
and less peripheral countries are more open than larger and more peripheral ones.
Estimating country-specific exporter wage premium Ωi:
As explained in Section 2, our model gives rise to a pure exporter wage premium, which is the
same for all exporting firms and can be computed according to
Ω̂i = 100(1 + R̂i)
θ̂iξ̂i
σ̂−1 − 100, (18)
when employing estimates θ̂i, ξ̂i, σ̂, and R̂i from above. As shown in the last two columns of Table
5, the premium amounts to about 10 percent on average. The exporter wage premium is highest
for Slovenia and France and lowest for Croatia and Serbia. In particular, the estimates for France
and Slovenia seem to be well in line with findings for other OECD countries. For instance, relying
on US Census data for 1984-1992, Bernard and Jensen (1999) report an exporter premium in a
firm’s average (production and non-production) wage of about 8.5 to 17.9 percent.16
3.3 Assessing the model fit
In the previous subsection we have estimated the fundamental parameters of the model outlined
in Section 2 using data for five European countries. The structural parameter estimates are in
line with estimates from other studies (where available). However, this does not provide insights
into the capability of the model to explain real world linkages between key economic variables.
To shed light on this issue, we now assess to what extent the calibrated model can reproduce
real-world observations from our data-set. In particular, one endogenous variable is central to
our analysis of firm heterogeneity: firm-level average wages. Hence, we focus on this variable in
assessing the model fit.
16The existence of an exporter wage premium is also well in line with recent empirical findings for Germany
(Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2007) and Mexico (Fŕıas, Kaplan, and Verhoogen, 2009). Existing studies
to this literature also find support for the key insight from our theoretical study that this premium can be
mainly explained by self-selection of the most-productive firms into export status and is not just a result of the
heterogeneity of firms in their workforce.
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We proceed in two steps. First, we use the observed pattern of revenues (sales) to learn about
firms’ productivity levels relative to the cutoff producer in the same country. For this purpose,
we consider rt(ϕ)/rt(ϕdi ) = ψ
t(ϕ)/ψt(ϕdi ), according to Eq. (6), and apply Eq. (10) to obtain
a model-consistent productivity profile from our data-set, i.e. we calculate ϕ/ϕdi for each firm
in country i.17 In a second step, we use the productivity patterns together with the estimated
variables θ̂i, σ̂ (which together imply ξ̂i), k̂i, and R̂i to calibrate the profiles of firm-level wages
according to Eq. (11). We can then compare the thus calculated profile of normalised wages
to the normalised wage profile in our data-set, and compute the correlation coefficient between
model-generated and observed values in order to obtain insights into the predictive power of the
model.
Since there is an overlap of exporters and non-exporters in productivity space in the data,
i.e. selection is not as sharp as in the Melitz (2003) model, we conduct this exercise for the
true and a theory-adjusted data-set, where ‘theory-adjusted’ means that we manipulate the
data to make it consistent with the following two conditions: (i) no overlap of non-exporters
and exporters in productivity space and (ii) an exporter share as observed in the raw data. To
achieve this goal without eliminating a huge amount of producers, we define for each country a
‘revenue cut-off’, such that the share of firms above this cutoff equals the share of exporting firms
of the respective country in our data-set, and then reclassify all firms below the cutoff as non-
exporters and all firms above the cutoff as exporters. This provides a newly constructed data-set
in which all firms’ export decisions are consistent with sharp selection into export status as in
Melitz (2003). Considering both the original and the ‘theory-adjusted’ data-set, we obtain two
correlation coefficients for each of the five economies. The corresponding results are summarised
in Table 6.
17This structural approach differs significantly from other strategies for estimating firm-level productivity. For
instance, sales per employee is a widely used proxy for labour productivity. However, according to our theoretical
model, sales per employee are just proportional to wages and therefore do not contain independent information
about productivity parameter ϕ. Hence, employing this measure would be at odds with our theory. Furthermore,
in recent years economists have used information on investment (see Olley and Pakes, 1996) or other inputs (see
Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) to estimate firm-level productivity in a structural dynamic approach. While we
could employ this method in principle, we do not do so, because the reasoning underlying this estimation method
is inconsistent with our assumptions (i) that labour is the only factor of production and (ii) that productivity
levels are constant over time. To assess the predictive power of the model, we must take all of its assumptions
seriously, and relying on a sophisticated method of estimating firm-productivity according to some other model
is in contradiction to the general purpose of following a structural estimation approach that builds upon the
theoretical model in Section 2. Saying this, we should also mention that we have employed other measures of
productivity – in particular also one that relies on Olley and Pakes (1996) – to see how robust our results are in
this respect. Notably, the model fit turns out to be good in all considered specifications.
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−− Table 6 about here −−
The correlation coefficients in Table 6 suggest the following conclusions. First, the parameter
estimates are quite successful in general when it comes to generating distributions of normalised
wages for our country sample. The correlation coefficient for log-transformed normalised wages
lies between 0.507 and 0.948 when relying on the original data-set and between 0.512 and 0.948
when considering the ‘theory-adjusted’ one.18 In comparison to other calibration studies in
international economics, the estimated correlation coefficients are quite high, so that we may
conclude that the model works fairly well in reproducing observed patterns of firm-level wage
payments.19 Furthermore, there is almost no difference in the estimated correlation coefficients
for the original and the ‘theory-adjusted’ data-set. This suggests that the observed overlap of
exporters and non-exporters in the productivity (and revenue) distribution does not lower the
predictive power of our model, even though it relies on the assumption of sharp self-selection of
firms into export status according to their productivity levels and thus cannot account for the
observed overlap, by construction.
4 Comparative static analysis
In this section, we use our model to compute the effect that the actual level of trade has on the
five countries in our sample, compared to a hypothetical situation of autarky. We first look at
the effect on the distribution of wages across firms in each of the five countries, and subsequently
address the consequences for aggregate employment.
4.1 The distribution of wages and operating profits across firms
In this subsection, we consider the effect of openness on compact measures of inequality across
firms in normalised wages for each of the countries in our sample. In the context of our model we
can easily assess the effect of openness by comparing the estimated values for normalised wages
18Using the same approach for assessing the ability of our model to reproduce observed patterns in operating
profits, we get correlation coefficients above 0.99 for each country in our sample. However, this result should
be interpreted with care. Since operating profits themselves are not directly observable in the data, they are
constructed by combining information on revenues and insights from our model. For that reason, the correlation
coefficients must be high by construction, when inferring model-consistent normalised productivity patterns from
observed revenue figures.
19For instance, see Alvarez and Lucas (2005) for the calibration of a multi-country Ricardian trade model along
the lines of Eaton and Kortum (2002).
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from Eqs. (10) and (11) for the actual degree of openness, measured by the estimated value
for the export market potential R̂i, with the values for the same variables in a counterfactual
situation with Ri = 0. In doing so, we employ the normalised productivity levels estimated in
Subsection 3.3 for both the original and the ‘theory-adjusted’ data-set. Then, we can compare
the distributions for the counterfactual (autarky) and benchmark normalized equilibrium values
by means of the standard deviation for log-transformed variables.20 The corresponding results
for each country from this experiment are summarised in Table 7.
−− Table 7 about here −−
Table 7 shows that trade brings about a greater inequality in firm-level wages everywhere.
The corresponding impact is sizable and amounts to 15.1 percent on average when relying on
productivity estimates from the original data-set and to 25.3 percent on average when relying
on ones from the ‘theory-adjusted’ data-set. This difference can be explained by the observed
overlap of exporters and non-exporters in the same productivity percentile, which is excluded
by construction in the ‘theory-adjusted’ data-set. While there is a quantitative difference in the
distributional effects of trade between the two data-sets, both share similar qualitative features.
In particular, the impact of trade on firm-level wage inequality is smallest for Croatia and Serbia,
and largest for Bosnia and Herzegovina and France. The latter is somewhat surprising, as we
would expect in general that trade effects are less pronounced in larger economies. However,
one should keep in mind that the comparative-static experiment conducted here is of different
magnitude for each economy and, with France being the only country that has been member
of the European Union over the whole time span for which data are available (2000-2008), it is
plausible that a movement from autarky to the observed degree of openness is associated with a
larger parameter change for France than for other countries in our sample.21 Finally, with log-
transformation, normalised wages are proportional to normalised operating profits, and hence
the figures in Table 7 also capture the impact of trade on inequality across firms in normalised
operating profits.
20As outlined in Footnote 17, we have to use model-consistent measures of productivity, when taking the idea of
a structural empirical approach seriously. For that reason, we can only infer information on normalised variables
from our data-set. This restricts the scope for comparative-static exercises. For instance, we cannot estimate the
impact of trade on other measures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient or the Theil index, as our approach
does not allow for determining absolute levels of the cutoff productivity in autarky or trade, which, however, is
needed for estimating changes in these inequality measures.
21This can be confirmed, when noting that the relevant term [θ̂iξ̂i/(σ̂−1)] ln(1+R̂i), cf. Eq. (11), is significantly
higher for France than the other countries in our data-set.
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4.2 Welfare and employment
In this subsection, we apply the model to get insights about general equilibrium effects of trade.
An issue that in the context of globalisation is of primary concern for workers is the increasing
risk of job loss (see Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). While our theory does not allow a direct
quantification of the employment effects of trade, we can derive a link between the effects of
trade on aggregate welfare, measured by per capita income (1−ui)w̄i, and aggregate employment,
respectively.22 As formally shown in the Appendix, our model relates welfare and employment
































respectively. Eq. (19) shows that the effect of trade on aggregate employment can take either
sign: higher per capita income (or, equivalently, higher aggregate output) increases employment,
ceteris paribus, as shown by the first term on the right hand side. The second term reflects the
fact that exporting induces higher wage payments and hence a cost-penalty, which, all other
things equal, makes the labour market imperfection more severe.23 We can use Eq. (19) together
with the parameter estimates from Section 3 to quantify how large the gains from trade must
be in order to generate positive employment effects relative to autarky at the observed degree
of openness. The results from this exercise are summarized in Table 8.
−− Table 8 about here −−
Columns 2-6 of Table 8 report employment changes for small, medium, and large welfare
effects of trade. These figures indicate that employment effects of trade are negative if gains
from trade are comparatively small despite the large change in the degree of openness underlying
22Estimating the employment effects or the welfare effects of trade independently, rather than just their rela-
tionship to each other, would require information about the absolute level of cutoff productivity ϕdi , which is not
available in our data-set – and cannot be estimated in a theory-consistent way (see Footnote 17).
23It is easily confirmed that (1 +Ri)







, which proves Γi < Φi and thus
a negative employment effect from the cost-penalty associated with exporting. Of course, when aggregate gains
from trade are accompanied by lower aggregate employment, this points to a more than proportional increase in
the average wage of employed workers.
24
our policy experiment. For instance, even welfare gains of 10 or 50 percent of (counterfactual)
autarky level income per capita are not sufficient for any country to generate positive employ-
ment effects. The largest relative decline in employment in our experiment is found for France
and Slovenia. However, noting that the OECD reports harmonized unemployment rates of 7.8
percent for France and 4.4 percent for Slovenia in 2008. Hence, the negative employment effects
in columns 2 and 3 of Table 8 amount to an increase in the rate of unemployment of less than
one percentage point for these two economies. On the other hand, the results in columns 5 and 6
suggest that for countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and France, gains from trade must be
more than 200 percent to be associated with positive employment effects at observed degrees of
openness relative to autarky. To shed further light on this issue, we report ‘break-even’ welfare
effects in column 7, which refer to the minimum level of gains from trade that is necessary to
avoid negative employment effects at observed degrees of openness relative to autarky.
Whether the calculated welfare changes that are necessary for avoiding negative employment
effects are unrealistically high or not is difficult to say, as the comparative-static exercise in this
subsection does not involve just small parameter changes, such as changes in trade costs of 10
or 15 percent, but instead refers to a policy experiment of huge magnitude in which countries
cease trade entirely in the counterfactual analysis. While studying such exercises is common
practice in trade theory, it is usually not at the agenda of empirical research as data on such
large policy experiments are typically not available.24 Due to the lack of empirical evidence,
we follow a different approach for getting an idea about the magnitude of gains that might be
involved if the countries in our sample move from autarky to the observed degree of openness
and compute the respective gains our model would predict for the benchmark scenario of two
fully symmetric countries.25 As shown in the Appendix, gains from trade between two identical


















24A notable exception is Bernhofen and Brown (2005) who provide estimates on the upper bounds of comparative
advantage gains from trade that Japan experienced after its opening up for trade in the 19th century.
25Lacking information upon the level of cutoff productivity ϕdi , we cannot compute welfare effects for asymmetric
economies and thus have to rely on a benchmark scenario of symmetric countries, when quantifying the magnitude
of the welfare stimulus from trade in our setting.
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Substituting the parameter estimates from Section 3, then allows us to quantify the gains from
trade between symmetric countries, in order to get a rough idea about the magnitude of welfare
gains involved in a country’s opening up from autarky to the observed degree of openness. The
computed welfare gains lie between 11.05 percent for Serbia and 41.05 percent for France, and
for all countries in the sample the welfare gains are significantly lower than those required for
a positive employment stimulus, according to Table 8.26 In view of these insights, we may be
tempted to conclude that the observed patterns of trade are associated with negative employ-
ment effects in the five European countries considered in our analysis. However, one should be
cautious when deriving general conclusions from a specific model that ignores potentially im-
portant features of the real world (such as external scale effects). On the other hand, by relying
on a specific model, we do not need to impose the restrictive assumption that the estimated
relationship between observed changes in trade costs and unemployment is monotonic, when
shedding light on large policy experiments, as, for instance, a country’s movement from autarky
to trade.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper introduces a fair-wage effort mechanism into an otherwise standard trade model
with heterogeneous firms to motivate a structural empirical approach for estimating patterns of
operating profits and wages across firms in large open economies. Employing firm-level data from
five European economies with altogether more than 100,000 firms, we can estimate all parameters
of the model using information from just a single data-base. Equipped with these parameters,
we identify an exporter wage premium of about 10 percent on average in our country sample.
Furthermore, our parsimonious theoretical model has a high predictive power and can explain
more than 70 percent of the variation in wages across firms in our data-set. In a counterfactual
analysis, we show that the observed extent of trade has significantly increased inequality of wages
and operating profits across firms relative to autarky. We also produce evidence suggesting that
trade is likely to have led to a modest reduction in total employment in all five economies despite
26The computed gains from observed trade are significantly higher than those reported by Eaton and Kortum
(2002) who conduct a similar counterfactual analysis in a multi-country Ricardian model for 19 OECD economies.
According to Eaton and Kortum (2002), welfare losses from moving towards autarky are modest. They lie in
between 0.2 percent for Japan and 10.3 percent for Belgium and they amount to 2.5 percent for France, which is
the only country that is considered in their as well as our study.
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the existence of aggregate gains from trade.
While following a structural empirical approach has many advantages over conventional
reduced-form empirical applications, it is particularly recommended if one is interested in large
policy experiments, as, for instance, a country’s movement from autarky to observed patterns
of trade, because one does not have to impose the restrictive assumption of a monotonic re-
lationship between trade costs and outcome variables of interest, which often does not exist
in models of international trade. For instance, as explained in Egger and Kreickemeier (2009,
2011), the link between trade costs and key variables of labor market performance need not be
monotonic, and hence conclusions from reduced-form estimations upon the general impact of
trade on employment and wages may be misguided from a theoretical point of view. On the
other hand, taking the structure of a theoretical model seriously, confines the set of possible
policy experiments. For instance, we cannot easily compute the welfare effects of trade between
asymmetric countries, as our data-set does not provide information on absolute productivity
levels, and proxies usually considered in the empirical literature are at odds with our theoretical
model.
However, this is not an argument against the use of a structural empirical approach, but
instead indicates that we need to consider more sophisticated mechanisms for determining firm-
level productivity than a simple lottery as suggested by the Melitz (2003) model. Going in this
direction is a natural next step, if one is interested in employing models of heterogenous firms
for estimating the consequences of trade for welfare and labor market outcome, which in our
view is a worthwhile task for future research.
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A. Derivation details
Employment effects of trade
In the following, we provide derivation details for Eq. (19). Total employment in the open


















where superscripts n and x are used for distinguishing between domestic employment of non-
exporters and exporters, respectively. Noting that lxi (ϕ) = (1 + Ri)
−
θiξiσ































































i , according to Eq. (9), we
can calculate
A1 =















and, noting that total labour income is proportional to total revenues and given by
(1− ui)Liw̄i =














































































i ) into the fair-wage constraint (4) for the marginal domestic producer and
noting that ψti(ϕ
d
i ) = f
d
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Combining Eqs. (31) and (32) establishes Eq. (19). QED
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Gains from trade between two fully symmetric countries
With trade between two fully symmetric countries, we get Ri = τ
1−σ
i , according to Eq. (7), and
M ti = (1 + χi)M
d







































































We can now use Eq. (35) together with Eq. (3) to solve for the wage rate of the marginal










σ−1 σ − 1
σ
ϕdi . (36)
Combining Eq. (36) with the fair-wage constraint of the marginal producer in Eq. (4), and noting
that ψti(ϕ
d
i ) = f
d
i , we can solve for per-capita income (1− ui)w̄i as a function of ϕ
d



















Hence, to get an explicit solution for (1 − ui)w̄i, we need to determine ϕ
d
i . To do this, we first


















27We keep country indices, in order to make clear, where country-specific estimates have to be employed in the
calibration exercise of Subsection 4.2
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)−ki , rni (ϕ
d
i )/σ = f
d
i as well as Eq.





























defined in the main text, and dividing the resulting expression byMdi gives average (per-period)





In Melitz (2003)-type models, the latter is usually referred to as the (modified) zero-cutoff
profit condition, since the outcome in Eq. (40) is directly linked to the condition that the
marginal producer in the market makes zero per-period profits in a (steady-state) equilibrium,
i.e. ψti(ϕ
d
i ) = f
d
i . To solve for ϕ
d
i , we can now combine the zero-cutoff profit condition with the
free entry condition, where the latter captures the result that new firms enter the productivity
lottery until the expected discounted profit of new entrants equals the cost of participating in
the productivity lottery, f ei . Assuming that firms have an infinite horizon, abstracting from time
discounting and assuming that all producers face an exogenous probability of exit, δi > 0, in
each period, in which they are active, the free entry condition in the steady-state equilibrium





δf ei . (41)





























































Dividing Eq. (43) by Eq. (44), finally gives Eq. (20). QED
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B. Tables
Table 1: Number of firms and percentage of exporters active
(Data pertain to the average year of 2000 to 2008)
Number Share of exporters
Country of firms (χi)






Table 2: Summary statistics for variables in logs. Data pertain to the average year of
2000 to 2008. Figures are means (top) and standard deviations (bottom).
sales oper. profits exports employees wages/empl.
Country (ln rtvi) (lnψ
t
vi) (ln) (ln) (lnwvi)
Bosnia and Herzegovina 5.18 2.78 3.55 2.31 0.72
1.52 1.70 2.30 1.51 0.42
Croatia 6.59 3.53 4.16 2.55 2.03
1.60 1.91 2.84 1.53 0.44
France 6.72 3.60 3.93 1.99 3.51
1.57 1.81 3.04 1.38 0.50
Serbia 6.04 3.02 3.35 2.43 1.01
1.67 2.09 2.38 1.58 0.53
Slovenia 7.02 4.18 5.56 2.73 2.56
1.73 1.73 2.93 1.68 0.36
Total 6.67 3.57 3.98 2.05 3.27
1.60 1.83 3.01 1.42 0.84
Note:
The log of exports is based upon a subsample of the observations due to truncation at zero exports. All
monetary variables are measured in 1,000 Euros.
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Table 3: Estimating the fair wage parameter θi and ξi
Country θ̂i Std.err. ξ̂i Std.err.
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.053 0.008 4.472 0.159
Croatia 0.114 0.005 3.511 0.061
France 0.099 0.001 3.713 0.022
Serbia 0.150 0.004 3.123 0.040
Slovenia 0.097 0.004 3.743 0.054
Total 0.102 0.001 3.685 0.027
Notes:
θ̂i is obtained from a model for each country which reads lnwvi =
θi ln r
tvi + µi + errorvi, where µi is a country fixed effect. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown
form.




Country γ̂i Std.err. k̂i Std.err. χ
−1/k̂i
i Std.err.
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.750 0.005 5.965 0.216 1.093 0.004
Croatia 0.815 0.004 4.306 0.078 1.135 0.002
France 0.866 0.004 4.287 0.032 1.207 0.002
Serbia 0.782 0.007 3.994 0.062 1.272 0.005
Slovenia 0.774 0.007 4.838 0.083 1.100 0.002
Total 0.861 0.004 4.306 0.039 1.204 0.002
Notes:







i is calculated using values for χi as observed in the data and summarised in Table
1, and for k̂i as reported in the fourth column of this table. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form.
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Table 5: Estimating averages of export market potential Ri
and the exporter wage premium Ωi
Country R̂i Std.err. Ω̂i Std.err.
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4.187 0.416 6.934 1.185
Croatia 1.296 0.060 5.860 0.377
France 3.780 0.097 10.286 0.170
Serbia 1.152 0.077 6.299 0.305
Slovenia 2.424 0.098 7.894 0.389
Total 3.533 0.099 9.830 0.202
Notes:
R̂i is estimated as suggested by Eq. (17), while Ω̂i is computed accord-
ing to Eq. (18). Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation of unknown form.
Table 6: Assessing the model fit in terms of correlation co-
efficients for observed and predicted normalised wages
original ‘theory-adjusted’
Country data-set data-set







The calculations of correlation coefficients are based on log-transformed
variables. Normalised productivity levels lnϕi − lnϕ
d
i are estimated
from observed revenue ratios, applying Eqs. (6) and (10), while cal-
culations of lnwvi − lnw
d
vi are based on Eq. (11) and the parameter
estimates in Section 3.
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Table 7: Simulating the impact of trade openness on the
dispersion of wages and operating profits











Calculations are based on log-transformed variables. Reported figures
are percentage changes of observed (Ri = R̂i) relative to predicted
counterfactual autarky (Ri = 0) outcome.
Table 8: Calculating the link between welfare and employment effects of trade
Employment effects of given ∆ Welfare ∆ Welfare for
Country 10% 50% 100% 200% 500% const. empl.
Bosnia and Herzegovina -7.07 -5.52 -4.05 -1.95 1.75 333.82
Croatia -5.41 -1.99 1.29 6.10 14.86 78.84
France -11.52 -8.76 -6.13 -2.29 4.64 279.22
Serbia -6.35 -1.90 2.42 8.83 20.73 70.53
Slovenia -7.64 -4.83 -2.14 1.77 8.83 150.25
Total -10.89 -8.04 -5.31 -1.32 5.90 259.28
Notes:
∆ Welfare refers to welfare changes in percent. The link between welfare and employment effects
of trade is calculated according to Eq. (19).
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